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Abstract. This paper analyzes the renegotiation problem in the context of public-private partnership projects. Utilizing a 
game-theoretic approach, an equilibrium is found in which the government finds that accepting renegotiation can be 
efficient. A first indicator is proposed based the public sector comparator (PSC) that can be estimated by policymakers 
as an additional tool when deciding about renegotiation. A second more theoretical indicator is derived to analyze the 
economic and financial variables affecting renegotiation. This indicator is applied to four case studies in different 
countries (England, Taiwan, Portugal and China) and the results suggest that the model performs well. 
 







In the last two decades, public-private partnership (PPP) projects are a growing research topic 
as asserted by Cui et al. (2018). The authors indicate some research gaps and research 
directions, one of which would be to explore and improve the efficiency of contract negotiation 
and renegotiation in the context of achieving flexible contracts. They remark that although the 
concept of ‘flexible contracts’ and ‘renegotiation’ introduce various alternative methodologies or 
guidelines, they are still at a nascent stage and offer enormous scope for refinement. In fact, 
Cruz et al. (2014) highlight that renegotiations are clearly one of the most critical issues 
affecting the performance of concessions. 
The present work focuses on financial renegotiations involving PPP projects, in particular, as 
it uses a game-theoretic framework to develop tools that assist in renegotiation decisions by 
relying on certain conditions to generate a practical method that can be applied to cases in the 
real world.  
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, the literature about renegotiation in 
PPP is reviewed. In section three, the main causes of renegotiation are identified. In section 
four, a renegotiation game framework is explained. In section five, two methods are introduced 
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that identify whether to reject or accept a renegotiation proposal. Section six analyzes four real 
case studies of PPP renegotiation. Finally, section seven draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
A recent review of the PPP literature by Cui et al. (2018) identified six potential research topics: 
financial packages and PPP application (G1), economic viability and value for money (VfM) 
(G2), risk management and success factors (G3), procurement and contract management (G4), 
performance management (G5), and governance and regulation (G6). Renegotiation appears 
as an important topic in the procurement and contract management (G4) group. 
Ho (2009) argues that financial renegotiation plays a critical role in the success of a PPP 
project. Financial renegotiation refers to revising financial subsidy measures after a PPP 
contract has been executed, when conditions have changed unfavorably and significantly. 
Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos (2013) describe the process of renegotiation in PPP projects as a 
bargaining process in which the parties seek to reach an agreement on one particular option 
from a set of available alternatives. Ho (2006) contends that the fact that the government may 
bail out a distressed project and renegotiate with the developer in PPP projects can lead to 
serious opportunism problems in project administration. Engel et al. (2014) posit that 
governments should limit contract renegotiations because they can erase the efficiency gains 
associated with PPPs. Hasselgren et al. (2014) point out that sometimes objective reasons arise 
that make renegotiation necessary, even in contracts that initially seemed to consider all 
possible contingencies. This is related to the paradigm of incomplete contracts established by 
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995). 
Bitran et al. (2013) assert that contract renegotiations typically mean high fiscal costs and 
more onerous contractual terms. Guasch et al. (2014) reported that a significant number of PPP 
projects have been renegotiated shortly after the contracts have been signed. These 
renegotiations frequently occur a short period of time after – and sometimes even before – the 
financial terms have closed. The authors claim that 68% of PPP projects are renegotiated and 
that the average time before renegotiation is 1 year after execution. In sectors such as transport 
or water, this problem is even more evident, with percentages of 78% and 87% and an average 
time of 0.9 and 0.8 years before renegotiation, respectively. 
The empirical evidence on PPP renegotiations at an international level is diverse. Gifford et 
al. (2014) argue that United States (US) PPP renegotiations have not experienced the same 
level of analysis as those in international markets, which might be explained by the relatively 
few US PPPs and scarce data availability. Infrastructure-oriented PPPs in the US constitute a 
relatively new market that is still growing. The authors posit that there is not enough evidence 
regarding the causes of renegotiations in US PPPs. Baeza and Vasallo (2010) note that Spain 
has a long history of partnering with the private sector to help build and operate public 
infrastructure and that its PPP contracts suffer from significant income overestimation and are 
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subject to frequent renegotiations. Cruz and Marques (2013) examine Portugal (the European 
country with the most PPP projects) and identify specific variables that explain why PPPs are so 
likely to be renegotiated in Portugal – the average renegotiation rates are 67% and 100% in the 
water and transportation sectors, respectively – such as the magnitude of concessions and the 
dearth of regulations governing the executed contracts. Guasch et al. (2014) analyze the 
renegotiation experience in Latin America and find a renegotiation rate of 61%. Chang (2013) 
asserts that compared with the developed countries, China is a latecomer to the practice of 
engaging in PPPs.  
Historically, the private sector was strictly forbidden to take part in the construction and 
operation of public infrastructure. Hasselgren et al. (2014) point out that after several years and 
hundreds of PPP projects, there have been no renegotiations in India. To avoid moral hazards 
in the bidding process, it was established that renegotiation is only allowed for exceptional 
cases. Renegotiation can be initiated by the government, the developer or by both parties. The 
government tends to renegotiate when there are changes to the ruling party, changes in 
priorities or because it cannot fulfill its contractual obligations. Conversely, the private sector can 
initiate renegotiation for opportunistic reasons and in seeking to maximize the net present value 
(NPV) of the PPP contract. Guasch et al. (2014) found that 61% of renegotiations are initiated 
by the developer.  
Hart and Moore (1988) and Dewatripont (1988) discuss the essence of renegotiation and its 
impacts. There are certain models of renegotiations, such as Maskin and Moore (1999), Segal 
(1999), Anderlini and Felli (2001), Ishiguro and Itoh (2001) and Tiong and Alum (1997). The 
present paper relies on Ho (2006) and develops an indicator when a government encounters 
the decision to rescue (or not rescue) a distressed project and what the impact is in terms of 
VfM. Developing useful tools for policy makers facing the dilemma of whether to renegotiate a 
PPP is important for several reasons: 1) if a request for renegotiation is always granted, the 
developers would then be incentivized to bid optimistically to win projects that will likely be 
renegotiated and 2) if renegotiation is expected, the agent may choose inefficient actions that 
reduce overall or social efficiency but increase the agent’s payoff.  
 
 
3. Causes of renegotiation 
 
Before analyzing the causes of renegotiation, it is important to distinguish the different types of 
PPP depending on the bundling and the compromises of the private sector. The Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) model implies that the private sector builds, operates, and transfers the asset to 
the public sector at the end of the period; DBOT means that the private sector designs (D), 
builds (B), operates (O) and transfers (T) the asset; the DBFOT model includes assistance in 
financing (F) a project. There are variations of these models depending on the bundling. For 
instance, the DBFOM includes maintaining (M) the infrastructure but there is no transfer; this 
model is also called Private Finance Initiative (PFI) arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK). 
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Actually, as asserted by Makovšek and Veryard (2016), the typical PPP contract is a DBFOM 
type, where the private partner designs, builds, finances and operates the asset. The present 
work will focus on this model including private financing. Iossa and Martimort (2012, 2015) 
indicate that the financier can benefit the project by providing information and experience. In this 
sense, external finances would alleviate the moral risk of the contract both in the construction 
and operation stages, thus improving the risk allocation. Note that DBFOM is the model that 
includes more services, increasing the probability of renegotiation at some stage. 
Tirole (1999) analyzes renegotiations in terms of transaction costs, explaining that 
renegotiation occurs because the cost of writing complete contracts can be high. In addition to 
contractual incompleteness, Marques and Berg (2010) consider that imperfect allocation of risk 
is an important factor in renegotiations. Fatokun et al. (2015) identify the following main factors 
involved in renegotiations of PPP contracts for road construction: the lack of an adequate 
contract design; frequent opportunistic behavior by both the public and private partners during 
implementation of PPPs; material changes in those conditions affecting revenue and costs that 
are beyond the reasonable assumptions in the original contract; corruption; and political and 
economic instability, which typically acts to reduce the chances of the public partner achieving 
its objective of VfM. Fatokun et al. (2015) posit that the driving factors behind PPP contract 
renegotiations in Spain include faulty contract design, defective regulations, over-estimation of 
traffic, inflexible contracts, changing construction risks and inadequate strategic network 
planning, among others.  
Hasselgren et al. (2014) classify the different reasons why renegotiations might arise into the 
following four categories that are presented in Table 1: The first category is technocratic and 
endogenous factors, which is related to the business and management aspects of PPP 
contracts. The second category is technocratic and exogenous factors, which can result in 
PPPs failing to meet their performance goals, generally due to the macroeconomic environment. 
The third category is subjective and endogenous factors, which is related to imperfect and 
asymmetrical information. In this regard, the private sector may bid aggressively with the 
expectation to renegotiate after winning. The public sector can be affected by selection bias, 
which tends to choose bids that promise more than can realistically be delivered. It can result in 
the so-called “winner’s curse,” where the bidder tends to bid below the actual cost, since he 
believes that this is the only way to win. In fact, Ho (2006) contends that opportunistic bidding 
behavior in PPPs indicates that bidders’ proposals intentionally understate the possible risks 
involved or overstate project profitability to win contracts from their competitors. Athias and 
Nuñez (2008) found evidence of a strong winner’s curse effect when the public agency has 
limited experience with PPPs. Cruz and Marques (2013) also conclude that the correlation in 
Portuguese PPPs between the type of award and ex post renegotiation supports both the 
winner’s curse and the strategic underbidding theories.  
Finally, the fourth category is subjective and exogenous reasons, which involve the behavior 
of the government and public sector. In democratic countries, the governors have a term of four 
or five years. This can generate a tendency to think in the short term and lose the long-term 
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perspective. When this happens, politicians can commit to PPP projects that they know will be 
renegotiated in the future when they are no longer in government. There is a severe risk of 
using PPPs to elude budgetary spending restrictions, transferring the fiscal burden to the next 
government. Principal-agent characteristics might also be particularly difficult to incorporate into 
public sector settings. The actors involved (for example, the legislature, individual politicians, the 
executive and its agencies) might relate to one another in many different ways in aiming to 
achieve a wide spectrum of objectives, sometimes consistent – and sometimes inconsistent – 
with one another. Bi and Wang (2011) recognize that current scholarship focused on moral 
hazard in PPP renegotiations is limited. 
 
Table 1. Causes of renegotiation - Four different categories 
Endogenous Factors 
1) Objective (Technocratic) 3) Subjective (Political) 
Management performance and 
coordination, construction risk, 
supply contract risk. 
Winner’s curse, opportunism, 
strategic misrepresentation. 
Organization theory, Engineering Contract/game theory, Transaction 
cost theory 
Exogenous Factors 
2) Objective (Technocratic) 4) Subjective (Political) 
Economic downturn, Changes in 
demand patterns, Changes in 
institutional environment. 
Public sector opportunism, 
Principal-agent problems. 
Institutional theory, Neoclassical 
theory 
Public choice theory, Political 
science 
Source: Own elaboration based on Hasselgren et al. (2014) 
 
According to Hasselgren et al. (2014), if the risks were properly allocated, the endogenous 
factors do not justify renegotiation of the contract, since they must be assumed by the 
corresponding parties (public or private). Only exogenous reasons and in extreme cases is the 
renegotiation mechanism enabled. An example of this could be the imminent bankruptcy of the 
country. Cruz and Marques (2013) assert that having a strong regulatory body may diminish the 
rate of renegotiations.  
 
 
4. Renegotiation game framework 
 
The present work is based on the game-theoretic framework developed by Ho (2006), who 
investigates when and how the government rescues a distressed project. In this sense, the 
model focuses on financial renegotiation involved in revisiting financial subsidy negotiations 
after a contract was executed, particularly when conditions have changed unfavorably and 
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significantly. The present paper introduces benefit functions for the two players – the developer 
and the government – allowing an analysis of the conditions that favor the renegotiation of a 
contract for purposes of obtaining an indicator of the efficiency of renegotiating a contract. 
Figure 1 presents the dynamic game in extended form. It is a two-stage game with two 
players (developer and government). The game begins from adverse situations in which the 
developer has two strategies: 1) they can declare the project bankrupt and the game is over; or 
2) the developer can attempt to ask the government to rescue and subsidize at a percentage of 
the initial investment and the cost flow (g). This second strategy implies that the developer must 
negotiate with the government. If the developer chooses to negotiate, the government has two 
strategies: 1) to reject renegotiation (letting the developer go bankrupt and retendering the 
project); or 2) to rescue the project and subsidize it.   
If the developer chooses project bankruptcy at the first stage or the government rejects to 
negotiate a subsidy (in a second stage), then the developer must pay a cost. Here, it is 
assumed that the payoff is 0, since the value of the equity shares held by the developer should 
approach zero prior to bankruptcy. In both cases, the government must retender the project with 
a cost associated with project retendering. Then, the payoff for the government is a new VfM 
given by VfM0 /(1+ ρT), where VfM0 is the initial or original positive value for money, ρ is the 
social discount rate and T is the waiting time until a new developer is contracted. The term 
1/(1+ρT) may be thought of as a discount factor. In this sense, the new VfM implies that the 





Figure 1. Renegotiation Game’s Equilibrium Path. Source: own elaboration. 
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of the initial investment and the cost flow, thus obtaining an annual increment of the payoff P(g)-
P(0). After the developer’s request for a subsidy, the government can reject the subsidy as 
mentioned before and receive a payoff (0, VfM0/(1+ρT)). However, if the Government decides to 
negotiate a subsidy, rescuing the developer will reduce the VfM from the original amount to 
VfM(g). Therefore, the payoff to the developer and the government will be (P(g)-P(0), VfM0(g)). 
Ho (2006) argues that there is a political cost associated with rescuing the project and 
subsidizing a private party. Cruz and Marques (2013) assert that renegotiation costs are difficult 
to calculate not only because there are different forms but also because the increased costs are 
frequently offset (at least in part) by certain benefits.  
Note that the best developer strategy is to request a subsidy because failing to ask results in 
a payoff of 0 (and if the request is rejected, the payoff is 0), but it is also possible that the 
request will lead to a positive payoff of P(g)-P(0).  
The government has two options: “negotiate the subsidy” or “reject” the proposal. Guasch et 
al. (2014) posit that governments with weak institutions face a crucial tradeoff between 
canceling and renegotiating a PPP contract to avoid a potential bankruptcy, among other 
outcomes. Thus, the number of cancelled contracts in Latin America is low (but has been 
increasing over the last 30 years) at approximately 5% of total PPP projects granted. This rate is 
slightly higher than the average for developing countries, which is 4.3%. 










                                               (1) 
 
The condition means that the impact of the reduction in the VfM resulting from the subsidy is 
less than the effect of retendering the project and waitgin for a new developer to take on the 
project. Note that VfM is considered as the objective function of government. Following Kennedy 
(2013), the criterion for a PPP to be rescued is that it continues to provide greater VfM than 
other possible procurement methods, including retendering the PPP to another private party. 
To understand this condition, the payoff model for the developer and the government must 
be explained. We consider a PPP project whose substance is to Design-Build-Finance-Operate-
Maintain (DBFOM) a determined infrastructure. The developer will receive a constant disposal 
payment (P) from the government and let us assume for the sake of simplicity that the project is 
infinite in time and that the annual cost to operate and maintain the infrastructure is constant. 
The developer will receive a payment corresponding to a NPV equal to zero for a determined 
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where ε is the equity percentage, I0 is the initial investment amount, c is the annual cost as a 
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percentage of the investment, i is the private interest rate and k is the IRR required for the 
project to be sustainable. These two financial variables will be expressed as follows: i=r+p and 
k=r+σ. Thus, the private financial rate (i) is equal to the sovereign financial rate plus a spread 
(p), and the IRR is equal to the sovereign rate (r) plus the required risk (σ). 
Solving the equation when NPV=0, the annual developer payment is obtained as shown in 
equation (3). 
))1((0 cprIP +−++= eeσ                                         (3) 
 
The government must decide between traditional public procurement and pursuing the project 
through a PPP. Sarmento (2010) remarked that VfM is one of the leading tools available to 
public managers to assess the value of pursuing a project through a PPP versus traditional 
procurement because it provides the public sector with a simple methodology to estimate the 
benefits, costs and risks involved in the project. Fatokun et al. (2015) assert that even if the 
importance of evaluating renegotiation in terms of VfM achievement is previously established, 
few empirically assess the relationship between these two concepts to address the challenge of 
under- or non-achievement of VfM in PPP road project transactions.   
Equation (4) presents the VfM of an infrastructure project. The equation has two main terms. 
The first term shows the government cost of following the traditional option in which r is a public 
discount rate and δ is a parameter representing expected risk. This parameter is typically 
estimated in an infrastructure project using a percentage of cost overruns multiplied by the 
probability of cost overrun. Cost overruns are an important parameter determining the 
infrastructure risk. See for instance, Singh (2010), Arvan and Leite (1990), Cantarelli et al. 
(2010), Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Flyvbjerg et al. (2004). See Lee (2008) 
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The second part of the equation represents the government cost if the project is pursued using 
the PPP option. In this sense, we have the flow of payments (P) to the developer and the 
proportion of the risk retained by the administration (1-λ). When the cost of the traditional public 
option is larger than the PPP option, VfM is positive and it will be efficient to pursue the PPP. 
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Solving the integrals in equation (5) and substituting the required payment presented in 
equation (3), we obtain the following expression of the VfM. 







                                (6) 
 
Note that equation (6) shows that VfM is positive when the percentage of the risk transferred 
that is associated with the public financing rate and the annual cost is greater than the weighted 
private risk and the required financial spread. Thus, if the developer has a high private risk or 
the financial spread is high with respect to the transferred public cost, it will be determined that 
the PPP option is not efficient. Arguments related to efficiency should explain why the private 
sector has a lower risk value than the public sector. Some authors assert that efficiency should 
be the only reason why the public sector is willing to pay a high price to the private sector. In 
fact, Engel et al. (2010) suggest that the higher cost of financing PPPs is not an argument in 
favor of public provision, since it appears to reflect both the combination of deficient contract 
design and the cost-cutting incentives embedded in PPPs. Thus, in the case of a correctly 
designed PPP contract, a higher cost of capital may be the price paid for the efficiency 
advantages accruing to PPPs. 
Note that VfM is increasing with c, as the annual percentage cost of the project rises, it is 
more convenient to follow the PPP option. This finding suggests that projects with important 
costs relative to initial investment are more likely to be implemented using a PPP structure. 
Even if equations (3) and (6) are the developer and government payoffs when the contract is 
signed, we are interested in the conditions contemplated when the project is negotiated. In this 
case, the developer NPV is recalculated using the following equation, in which g is the 
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In this case, the developer will request a new payment determined by equation (8). 
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Equation (8) has an effect on the VfM of the government in determining a reduction with regard 
to the original amount when the developer won the tender, as shown in equation (9). 
 




                     (9) 
 
Note that the renegotiation variable g has two effects on VfM. Increasing g will reduce the 
benefits of the PPP project, thus reducing the effect of the transferred risk and increasing the 
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private cost that is measured by the private risk and the financial spread. 
Equation (9) is the payoff to the government of renegotiating the subsidy to the developer; in 
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The renegotiation will result in a Nash equilibrium insofar as equation (9) will be larger than 
equation (10). Expression (11) shows the condition in which the request (g) made by the 


















                                                  
(11) 
 
Considering that VfM is positive, when the condition takes the equality, it makes no difference to 
the government to “renegotiate” or to “reject” the proposal. Notably, the renegotiation level is 
positively related to the social discount rate, the waiting time until the new developer takes on 
the project, the cost overrun, the level of transferred risk, the percentage cost, and the public 
interest rate and is negatively related to the private risk level, the financial spread requested by 
the financial system and equity level, since typically σ-p>0. 
 
 
5. Methodological proposal and the indicator of renegotiation 
 
This section introduces two possible practical tools to analyze the decision of a government 
facing a renegotiation. The first methodology is based on the public sector comparator (PSC), 
and the second methodology is based on the design of a general indicator. 
It is well known that the PSC is used by a government to make decisions about VfM in PPP 
projects. In fact, there are many government manuals in different parts of the world that 
consider this methodology. Examples of these manuals are the VDTF (2001) in Victoria-
Australia, the PBC (2003) in Canada, the NTSA (2004) in South Africa, the DPER (2007) in 
Ireland, the Coulson (2008) in UK, the MAPPP (2008) in France, the Australian Government 
(2008) in Australia, the UTFP (2009) in Italy, the DNP (2009) in Colombia, the KDI (2010) in 
South Korea, the SHCP (2010) in Mexico, the MEF-CND (2012) in Uruguay, the MEF (2014) in 
Peru and the World Bank (2012) as a general guide. Based on these methodologies, to 
compute the VfM, we can establish a form to evaluate the convenience of renegotiation. 
Sarmento (2010) indicates that to compute the PSC, we need to estimate the public project 
cash flow including the full costs, revenues and risks discounted at the public sector rate to 
determine the NPV. Comparing this amount with the discounted value of payments (including 
the risks and costs retained by the public sector) to the private supplier, we obtain the 
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estimation of the VfM. The author also considers the convenience of conducting the PSC prior 
to the bid. Considering this method, which is also included in the abovementioned manuals, we 
can compute the VfM as in equation (12), where the present value of Ct represents the most 
efficient form of public procurement, the present value of Pt is the PPP provision, r is the public 
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Rejecting the subsidy implies VfM(ρT), which is given by equation (14). Note that (1+ρT) is a 
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There are two conditions for renegotiation: 1) VfM(g)-VfM(ρT) >0, where the VfM with the 
subsidy is larger than that to postpone the original VfM for a time T; and 2) VfM(g)>0, where the 
VfM is still positive with the subsidy, otherwise it is convenient to the public provision. 
Rearranging VfM(g)-VfM(ρT), we obtain the equation (15). When RVfM is positive, 
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Note that computing derivatives of RVfM with respect to g, ρ and T we obtain the expected 
results. On the one hand, ∂RVfM/∂g < 0 implies that the larger the subsidy, the lower the 
convenience to renegotiate. On the other hand, ∂RVfM/∂ρ> 0 and ∂RVfM/∂T > 0 implies that the 
larger the social discount rate (ρ) or the larger the time to postpone the project (T), the larger the 
convenience to renegotiate. One of the limitations of this indicator is the political cost, which is 
difficult to measure and to include. It is necessary to consider the evaluation of the political costs 
of saving the project and postponing the project. A second limitation is related to the ability to 
avoid the “winner’s curse”. In this case, it is difficult to compare the proposed renegotiation and 
the postponed project because it is necessary to work with a better estimation than the 
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VfM0/(1+ρT), since the VfM0 of the original winner project would be underestimated. 
We can propose a more general second tool considering equations (9) and (10). This 
indicator has similar characteristics and limitations to those of the first tool, but it will be useful 
for examining the economic and financial relationships and analyzing the study cases. 
Considering condition (11), it is possible to define the “renegotiate” variable, R. This variable is 
positive when renegotiate is the more efficient decision and negative when rejecting 
renegotiation is the best strategy. 
 
{ } { } ))1(()1()()1( pgTTcrgTTR eeσρρρdλρ −+++−++−=                         (16) 
 
where R is a function of a vector X of ten variables (ρ, T, δ, λ, g, r, c, ε, σ, p). When complete 
information about the project is available for each element, R is calculated deterministically. 
However, when a variable in X is not known, a probability distribution will be assigned based on 
the empirical evidence. Therefore, it is possible to apply Monte Carlo simulations to obtain the 
simulated distribution of R(X).  
In particular, it will be informative to test the decision to renegotiate by a determined amount 
expressed as a percentage of the initial investment, which is easily obtained by computing 
(P(g)/k - P(0)/k)/I0) –the difference between the total amount of payments following acceptance 
of the renegotiation minus the total amount of the original payment flows over the initial 
investment. The total cost of renegotiating as a percentage of I0 is g(k+c)/k. 
The next step is to make an assumption for each variable considering that the particular 
projects in some cases may have some information about some variables. For instance, ρ 
generally takes a value of 12% internationally. According to Esty (2000), ε typically takes a 
value that is between 10% and 35% in these types of projects compared with a range of 65% 
and 75% in industrial firms. 
An important consideration should be noted in the case of the cost overrun variable, . This 
variable is typically modeled as normal, but some evidence indicates that it is not the most 
efficient distribution because the probability of obtaining variables larger than the mean is higher 
than obtaining variables lower than the mean. Although Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) assume that cost 
overruns are normal, a number of studies have shown that overruns are not normal. Love et al. 
(2014) find that cost overruns follow a generalized log-logistic distribution function. Bertisen and 
David (2008) argue that the evidence suggests that cost overruns are shifted lognormal. 
Horman (2001) highlights that a lognormal distribution best suit cost overruns because this 
distribution is best for stochastic estimates of cost variables, as shown by Wall (1997). Since 
most of the cost overrun information used in this study is based on Flybjerg et al. (2007), which 
provides only the mean and standard deviation, a generalized log-normal distribution will be 
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Table 2. Data inputs for the analysis of the percentages of PPP renegotiations  
Variable Code 












Annual Cost (a) c 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 
Public interest rate(b) r 4.07% 4.07% 4.07% 4.07% 2.27% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13% 
Equity (a) ε 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 
Private interest rate(b) i 5.32% 5.32% 5.32% 5.32% 4.02% 4.38% 4.38% 4.38% 
Cost overruns (mean) 
(c) 
δ 27.60% 27.60% 20.40% 33.80% 8.40% 22.40% 22.40% 25.70% 
Transfer risk (a) λ 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
Social discount rate(a) ρ 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 
Public waiting time (a) T 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
IRR (b) k 11.77% 13.85% 12.09% 12.96% 10.17% 11.11% 11.11% 9.95% 
Renegotiations (%) (d) 
 
68% 41% 78% 92% 40% 50% 73% 55% 
Prob. Renegotiation (e)  22.68% 19.45% 14.31% 24.57% 3.94% 16.84% 16.83% 23.02% 
 
Source: Own calculations. (a) Estimated parameters based on NAO (2009) and Esty (2000), and transfer risk in the 
BOO model suggested by Allan (2001) and Ho (2009); (b) Data from the Damodaran website: 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/; (c) Taken from Flyvbjerg (2007); (d) taken from Guasch et al. (2014); (e) The 
simulated probability that the estimated R is positive and then renegotiation is convenient. 
 
 
Before conducting the analysis of the four case studies, an exercise was carried out to 
determine whether the level of PPP contract renegotiations might have some connection with 
the probability of renegotiating. Table 2 shows the input data for the exercise based on the 
levels of renegotiation presented by Guasch et al. (2014) for different sectors and regions, 
including Latin America (LA), United States (US), England (UK) and France.  
It is important to clarify that Hasselgren et al. (2014) stipulate that one should be cautious 
with the conclusions obtained by analyzing the percentages of renegotiations. Due to practical 
differences in the nature and intrinsic particularities of each case, it is not advisable to use them 
to estimate the frequency of PPP renegotiation, considering that no important variables (such as 
the amount of investment projects requested in each case) are identified and their capacities 
and institutional strengths are not known. 
The objective here is to show graphically whether there can be a relationship that presents a 
greater propensity to renegotiate because the probability of accepting a renegotiation is higher. 
For this, the information in Table 2 was used for each type of project. Monte Carlo simulations 
were conducted for a renegotiation request (g) of 10%, considering an order for an initial 
amount given, and the acceptance percentage of the renegotiation was taken therefrom.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of renegotiations and the probability of renegotiation. Source: Own calculations 
based on data from Guasch et al. (2014) 
 
Figure 2 shows the cloud of points between renegotiation and the percentages indicated by 
Guasch and the calculated probability. If a straight line is fitted, a positive correlation of 0.48 
between the variables can be gleaned, which seems to suggest a possible relationship between 
the probability that renegotiation related to a project will be accepted and the percentage of 
renegotiations that were realized. Unfortunately, there is not more data to undertake a deeper 
analysis in this regard, although a more rigorous analysis requires considering each particular 
project and other variables, including institutional variables. In fact, Iossa and Saussier (2018) 
assert that weak institutions reduce the ability to transfer the risks and commitments assumed in 
the contract credibly. Furthermore, Iossa and Martimort (2016) indicate that weak political and 
regulatory institutions reduce the performance of PPP contracts by raising the risk of corruption. 
Iossa and Saussier (2018) remark that the government’s lack of commitment to renegotiate, 
as well as weak governance, explains the reasons for the frequent revisions of contracts in LA 
countries. In many of these countries, the regulatory agencies receive little training and 
instruments to carry out their mandate. In many cases, these agencies are under political 
control that affects their autonomy. Considering LA countries as a proxy of weak institutions and 
developing countries, a larger average renegotiation rate and probability are observed 
compared to developing countries. In fact, the average renegotiation rate in LA countries is 70% 
and the average probability is 20%, whereas in developed countries, the average renegotiation 
rate is 55% and the average probability is 15%. Note that the estimated probabilities seem to 
predict higher renegotiation rates in LA countries with respect to developed countries. 
 
 
6. Case studies and empirical evidence 
 
The following four case studies were selected considering the available information, the number 
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railways) but differing governance environments. The China case was also selected as a control 
case, since it is an example of a successful project after two years of hard negotiations. The two 
European countries, UK and Portugal, are different. The UK economy (GDP of 2,629.20 billion 
in 2016) is larger than that of Portugal with an estimated GDP of USD 204.80 billion. According 
to Cruz and Marquez (2011), the latter country has the largest spending on PPPs as a 
percentage of GDP in Europe. China and Taiwan are from different governance environments in 
East Asia. China is the second largest economy in the world with a GDP of USD 11,218.30 
billion and an economy that is highly regulated by the government. Chang (2013) argues that 
China is a latecomer to PPP practices, at least compared with developed countries. Historically, 
the Chinese private sector was strictly forbidden from getting involved in the construction and 
operation of any public infrastructure. Taiwan is one of the four Asian Tigers that underwent 
rapid industrialization and maintained exceptionally high growth rates. Nowadays, it has a high-
income economy with a GDP of USD 528.60 billion in 2016. 
Considering the Global Competitiveness Index 2017-2018 computed by the World Economic 
Forum, in terms of infrastructure, the UK ranked 11th, Taiwan 15th, Portugal 18th and China 
46th. Note that there are differences with respect to the public sector performance; according to 
the same index, the UK ranks 15th, China 26th, Taiwan 38th and Portugal is in a far position at 
95th.       
According to Bing et al (2005), the UK prefers to allocate the majority of the risk to the 
private sector. On the contrary, Ke et al. (2010) found that preferences in China indicate that no 
risk fell solely on the private sector. Governance in Taiwan is also different from China with 
respect to the private sector. Chan et al. (2010) suggest that one of the major challenges to the 
successfully implementation of PPP projects is the lack of an effective risk assessment model 
and an equitable risk-sharing mechanism. It is interesting to note that in the included project 
from China, 80% of the risks were allocated to the private sector, and the risks beyond the 
control of the private sector were shared or bore by the government. 
Table 3 summarizes all the available parameters, assumptions and the computed R indicator 
for the four cases. 
 
Case 1 corresponds to the London Underground, a metro system serving large areas of 
London, England. The information of this case is reported in the NAO (2009) and was analyzed 
by Kennedy (2013), Hallikeri (2015) and Sheikh et al. (2015). By the end of the 1990s, the 
public was becoming less confident about the safety and efficiency of the system. Several 
accidents had occurred on the London Underground, and the UK government announced a 
modernization program to be implemented by means of a PPP. NAO (2000) asserts that in 
March 2000, the contracts were expected to deliver £12-13 billion of capital and maintenance 
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Table 3. Parameters of the four case studies 
Variable Description Metronet (UK) MTS (Portugal) THSR (Taiwan) Metro Line 4 (China) 
C Annual Cost/Investment 14.96% 14.96% 14.96% 14.96% 
r Public Interest Rate 3.50% 6.00% 4.07% 6.00% 
ε % Equity 12.00% 15.00% 25.00% 30.00% 
σ % Project Risk 7.61% 4.45% 8.89% 1.50% 
i Private Interest Rate 4.38%(a) 7.00% 5.32% 6.30% 
p Spread (i-r) 0.88% 1.00% 1.25% 0.30% 
δ Cost Overrun  (44.7%, 38.4%)(b) (44.7%, 38.4%)(b) (44.7%, 38.4%)(b) (44.7%, 38.4%)(b) 
λ Transferred Risk 80.00% 80.00% 80.00% (70%, 80%, 90%) (c) 
ρ Social Discount Rate 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 
T Social Waiting Time (1, 2, 3) (c) 3 3  (2, 3) (d) 
k IRR 11.11%(a) 11.11% 12.96% (7%, 8%) (d) 
g(c+k)/k Renegotiated Amount 43.90% 35.56% 12.20% 20.00% 
R Renegotiation Indicator -0.03494 -0.02320 -0.00396 0.00174 
 
Source: Own calculations. (a) The IRR and engineering/construction interest rate in Europe are taken from the 
Damodaran website: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/; (b) Taken from Flyvbjerg (2007). Lognormal distribution is 
assumed (mean, standard deviation). (c) Triangular distribution is assumed (minimum, more probable, maximum). (d) 
Uniform distribution is assumed (minimum, maximum). 
 
The contracts were bid on and won by two private consortiums, Metronet and Tube Lines. 
They were schedule to work over a 30-year period, beginning in 2004. However, by 2007, 
Metronet had already entered into insolvency administration after it could not meet its 
obligations. One important limitation is the lack of complete information; no one knew the 
conditions of the less accessible parts of the Tube’s infrastructure, making difficult to accurately 
estimate the cost of future maintenance. Considering the cost uncertainty of the project, the 
government decided to break the 30-year project in four 7.5-year sections, allowing for periodic 
reviews. By 2010, Tube Lines had also entered into insolvency administration under similar 
circumstances. The result was that the PPP had completely failed, resulting in huge losses to 
the public and several government-led inquires followed that heavily criticized Metronet and 
Tube Lines.  
NAO (2009, p. 17) presents the cost structure of the Metronet project after 7.5 years: 
considering that investment is ₤4.1 billion and operational expenditures, administration and 
financing costs are ₤4.6 billion, the c is estimated as an average of 14.96% per year. The same 
report asserts that the government’s discount rate, r, is 3.5% and the equity level is 12%.  
Project risk was estimated to be 7.61%, based on the Damodaran website for information in 
the engineering and construction sectors in Europe, where the private interest rate is 4.38% and 
the IRR is 11.11%. Generally, transferred risk is approximately 80%, and the social discount 
rate is typically set at 12%. Cost overrun is modeled by applying a lognormal distribution, based 
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on Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), who indicate that the raw mean and standard deviation of rail projects 
are 44.7% and 38.4%, respectively. Flyvbjerg (2007) claims that there is no significant 
difference between urban and other types of rail in terms of cost overruns. Finally, social waiting 
time is modeled using a triangular distribution, with a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 3 
years until a new developer is operational. 
According to NAO (2009), considering the 7.5 years, the capital expenditure was ₤4.1 billion 
and the developer required an additional ₤1.8 billion; this additional amount (g(c+k)/k) 
represents 43.90% of the investment. 
Note that applying VfM equation (6) to the project before the required amount generates VfM 
equivalent to ₤5.76 billion when applying the mean cost overrun of 44.7%. However, the impact 
of the 43.90% required by the developer would change the decision to maintain the contract. 
The government notes that for a period of 7.5 years, the expected investment was ₤4.1 billion, 
but the developer required an additional ₤1.8 billion (see Figure 3). Thus, evaluation of VfM 
must be undertaken in this context. 
 
 
Figure 3. Metronet’s project spend as of July 2007. Source: Own elaboration based on NAO (2009, p. 17). 
The first period runs from April 2003 to October 2007 (7.5 years). 
 
In a deterministic context, considering a cost overrun of 44.70% and a social waiting time of 
2 years until a new developer is operational, the R indicator is -0.03494. In fact, the decision of 
the government was to reject the proposal and reopen the project to public administration. 
The simulated distribution of R is obtained running 1,000,000 trials. As shown in Figure 4, 
the probability of renegotiation is 2.72%, which means that under this structure, there is a 
97.28% likelihood of rejecting the renegotiation. 
Note that even when the convenience of renegotiation is clearly rejected, the government did 
not decide to tender the project, but decided to return the project to the public administration. 
According to Hallikeri (2015) the decision may be the correct one because there were difficulties 
in measuring costs and allocating risks, and in this case, undertaking a PPP is the wrong 
strategy for a public sector that seeks value for money. 
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Figure 4. Simulated distribution of R for the Metronet Case. Source: Own calculation applying Crystal Ball. 
 
 
Case 2 is the Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS) in Portugal. Information about the case can 
be found in Ferreira (2014). According to Cruz and Marques (2011), Portugal shows the largest 
PPP spending in Europe as a percentage of GDP. In fact, the use of the PPP model as a 
financing scheme has led to underestimations regarding future annual burdens, and the fiscal 
impact due to PPP renegotiations is high. One large PPP project is the concession of the 
southern Tagus surface metro to Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS).   
In 1999, a tender was launched in connection with the project, pursuant to which the private 
partner would be responsible for the construction, equipment supply, and financing for the 
operation and maintenance (DBOFT) of the Southern Tagus surface metro. In 2002, the 
concession was awarded to MTS for 30 years. 
IRR is estimated at 11.11% after reviewing the Damodaran website’s cost of equity for 
engineering and construction in Europe. The public discount rate in the case of Portugal is 6%, 
whereas the social discount rate is 12%. The social waiting time is estimated at 3 years by 
calculating the period from the tender until the MTS was functional. As in the other cases, the 
cost overrun is modeled by applying the mean and standard deviation of rail projects at 44.7% 
and 38.4%, respectively. The private interest rate is 7% and the transfer risk is approximately 
80%. The concessionaire contributed approximately 15%. 
The total investment cost was € 284 million, and the VfM was € 283 million. The 
renegotiation implies a cost of € 101 million (35.56% of the investment) which in our case 
reduces VfM to € 127.31 million if renegotiation is accepted or € 181.08 million if the project 
must be retendered. In this case, the indicator R is -0.02320, which suggests not rescuing the 
concession. 
Figure 6 shows the simulated distribution for the MTS case with an 11.39% probability of 
accepting the renegotiation and an 88.61% chance of rejecting it. Although the recommendation 
is negative, Portugal accepted renegotiations with MTS. Ferreira (2014) asserts that this case 
shows that the government’s bad preparation when negotiating the concession contract led to 
its lack of decision power during the construction process. 
 
 




Figure 6. Simulated distribution of R for the MTS Case. Source: Own calculation applying Crystal Ball. 
 
All this leads to a misallocation and an inadequate management of risk and renegotiation. Cruz 
and Marques (2011) stress that between 2002 and 2004, when renegotiations took place, a total 
of 8 ministers, 3 secretaries of state and 3 project leaders were involved in the project. From the 
public sector side, there was thus a clear governance problem, which weakened advocacy for 
the public interest when negotiating with the private sector (which is stable and builds up 
knowledge over time). This analysis (at least partially) explains why the government's decision 
does not match the recommendation of the indicator suggested under both deterministic and 
probabilistic result analyses. It is also consistent with the low world position of public-sector 
performance.  Portugal has the worst rank (position 95) of the four countries in the public-sector 
performance index compared to the rest of the four countries 
 
Case 3 corresponds to the High Speed Rail in Taiwan. The case information is reported by 
Dutzik et al. (2011) and also analyzed by Ho (2009). In 1998, the Taiwan High Speed Rail 
Corporation (THSRC) was awarded a 35-year concession to build and operate the Taiwan High 
Speed Rail (THSR), partially based on THSRC’s promise to build the system without 
government financing. However, the company began to run into difficulties after the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, when it was forced to take out high-interest loans to pay for the 
project. 
The investment cost is $16.4 billion, the equity level is 25%, the social waiting time is 3 
years, and the social discount rate is 12%. The annual cost as a percentage of the investment is 
considered the same percentage as in the Metronet case, i.e., 14.96%. 
Project risk was estimated at 8.89%; the Damodaran website was again checked to 
determine that the private interest rate for the engineering and construction sectors in emerging 
markets was 5.32%; the IRR is 12.09%; and as discussed above, the transfer risk is 
approximately 80%. Cost overrun is modeled by applying a lognormal distribution, based on 
Flybjerg et al. (2004), using the raw mean and standard deviation for rail projects. 
When the contract was executed, the VfM – including a cost overrun of 44.7% – is estimated 
at $14.69 billion and even after including the $2 billion requested by the developer, the VfM 
remained at $9.63 billion. Considering that the VfM is $9.4 billion if the contract is retendered, 
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the R indicator of -0.00396 suggests that it is not efficient to renegotiate the contract. 
Figure 5 shows a simulated distribution of R obtained by running 1,000,000 trials. The 
probability of renegotiation is 28.32%, which indicates that under this structure there is a 
71.68% chance of rejecting the renegotiation. Thus, the probability of renegotiation in this case 
is higher than in the Metronet one. 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulated distribution of R for the High Speed Rail Case. Source: Own calculation applying 
Crystal Ball. 
 
Ho (2009) contends that the Taiwanese case is an important project and that projects that 
are too important or too expensive for society to allow them to fail (or default) are not good 
candidates for PPPs. The costs requested are similar in both cases, $1.8 billion in the Metronet 
case and $ 2 billion in the THSR Case. However, the proportion of the investment is different; in 
the first case it represents 43.90% of the investment and in the High Speed Rail case, it 
represents 12.20%. 
The Taiwanese government might have allowed the THSRC to go bankrupt and cease 
operations when the company ran into financial trouble. However, doing so would have resulted 
in the loss of a critical public asset, leaving the government with little choice but to prop up the 
failed business plan of a private developer with public funds. In any case, the indicator does not 
consider the mistakes made by the government. As mentioned, a megaproject is not a good 
candidate for a PPP and the political costs of not recuing such a project are very high. In 
addition, Ho (2009) indicates that the government was very aggressive at adopting PPPs for 
almost all public infrastructure projects, encouraging an opportunistic attitude and many related 
problems. 
 
Case 4 is the Beijing Metro Line Nº4 in China and the case was analyzed by Chang (2013), 
Liu and Wilkinson (2015) and Li (2017). This is an example of a successful case and 
renegotiation occurred during the negotiation of the contract. In this sense, the case is included 
as a control case to compare the results.  
The latter authors claim that the project was the Mainland China’s first PPP project involving 
the development and operation of an urban rail transit system. According to Chang (2013), the 
Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation (BIIC) decided to implement a PPP model for the 
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Beijing No. 4 line project for a 30-year period. The objective of the project was to accelerate 
Beijing’s metro development for the 2008 Olympic Games. In 2004, following a public tender 
process, the Beijing MTR Corporation was selected to undertake this development. The contract 
was under negotiation for one more year, and it was not finalized until 2006.  
Liu and Wilkinson (2015) posit that IRR is estimated between 7-8%, and it is assumed that 
IRR is distributed uniformly between 7-8%. Chang (2013) indicates that the discount rate is 6%, 
the interest rate is 6.3% and the equity level is 30%. The annual cost is estimated at 14.96% (as 
in the previous cases), and the social discount rate is 12%. Considering the periods between 
the public tender and the operation of the developer, the time is distributed uniformly between 2-
3 years. Transfer risk is assumed to be triangularly distributed (70%, 80%, 90%). Since the 
project is an urban railway, cost overruns are modeled by applying the mean and standard 
deviation of rail projects, which are 44.7% and 38.4%, as in the previous cases. 
The total investment cost was $2.4 billion, and considering a transfer risk of 80%, an 
average IRR of 7.5% and an average cost overrun of 44.7%, the VfM was $2.73 billion. 
Renegotiation estimated a cost of $480 million, representing 20% of the investment. According 
to Chang (2013), this percentage is usual for Beijing projects. Renegotiation would reduce the 
VfM to $2.16 billion if renegotiation was accepted and to $2.10 billion if the project was 
retendered. In this case, the indicator R is 0.00174, thus suggesting that the renegotiation 
should be accepted. 
Figure 7 shows the simulated distribution for the Beijing Metro Line 4 case with a 39.38% 
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We analyzed four cases of renegotiation for similar types of projects under different 
governances. It seems clear that the UK has the most solid institutions and the choice to not 
renegotiate according to the indicator was decided by the government. As mentioned, China 
was a control case because it is an example of a successful case, but note that it behaved as 
forecasted by the indicator. The outliers are the cases from Portugal and Taiwan.  
Taiwan decided to renegotiate but the indicator suggested the opposite; however, in this 
case, there may be some issues not captured by the indicator. For instance, it is highlighted that 
the project is too important to fail and too expensive to default and there is a hidden cost of 
abandoning the project. It is also important to remark the economic context in Taiwan due to the 
Asian Crisis at the end of the 1990s and the increases in the interest rates, which would also 
affect the cost of retendering the project. In this situation, the VfM of retendering the project 
could be overestimated, but in any case, the project should not have been executed as a PPP.  
Portugal renegotiated the project but the indicator has the largest probability of no 
renegotiation. This seems to be a clear case of weak governance, as suggested by Cruz and 
Marques (2011) and Ferreira (2014). It is also illustrative that Portugal has the worst rank in the 
public-sector performance index among the four countries. Marques (2017) considers that a 
contract alone does not protect the public interests; it is necessary to have regulations and an 
independent regulatory authority.  
Note that even when these governments did not compute this indicator, we can see the 
potential to correctly predict the government’s behavior in the cases of UK (rejecting 
renegotiation) and China (accepting renegotiation). Taiwan is a case where the project was not 
recommended as a PPP. Finally, Portugal is an example of the effects of a lack of regulations 
and poor performance of public institutions affecting the renegotiation decision.  




This study aims to contribute to the study and analysis of the subject of financial renegotiations 
regarding PPP projects. Guasch et al. (2014) contend that the observed high incidence of 
renegotiations is a serious problem and thus question the effectiveness of PPP programs as a 
general matter, suggesting an abuse of the instrument and its use for opportunistic reasons 
rather for well-founded contractual reasons. Rozas et al. (2012) note that excess renegotiations 
are one of the main problems mentioned in the infrastructure development literature. As 
Hasselgren et al. (2014) argue, renegotiation should not be treated casually. It should be used 
only exceptionally, as the direct effect will typically be adverse to the public interest. 
The reason to develop useful tools for policy makers when deciding to renegotiate a PPP is 
well established by Ho (2006). In fact, Ho (2006) emphasizes two reasons related to the 
problems of asymmetric information, i.e., the principal-agent problem and moral hazard. The 
first occurs when a future developer knows that a request for renegotiation is generally (or even 
always) granted; in that case, he would then have substantial incentive to bid optimistically to 
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win the project regardless of costs. The reason that an overly optimistic proposal can have a 
higher chance of winning is because some crucial and developer-specific information regarding 
the project is difficult for the government to verify and can be untruthfully revealed in the 
development proposal as a result. The second reason occurs after the contract is signed: if 
renegotiation is expected, the developer may engage in inefficient actions that will reduce 
overall social efficiency but increase the developer’s ultimate payoff. 
In this context, we employed the dynamic game-theoretic framework involving financial 
renegotiation developed by Ho (2006). In this way, we made contributions regarding the 
incorporation of payment functions that allow conclusions regarding the influence of certain 
variables in the renegotiation of a PPP project. In addition, we were able to apply the model in 
the real world. Considering the applied computation of the VfM based on the PSC, we propose 
a method for estimating the convenience of renegotiation versus postponement of the project. 
This method can be practically computed given that the VfM is generally estimated in many 
countries such as the UK, which explains the method in Coulson (2008). Of course, the indicator 
suffers from the same limitations as the PSC. Large transfer risk does not assure more VfM as 
this does not represent an optimal risk allocation between the public and private sectors. A 
context of weak governance and the lack of regulations does not ensure the reliability of the 
results. The political costs of retendering or rejecting the project are difficult to estimate, even if 
in some cases they could be compensated. The effects of asymmetric information affect the 
indicator. For instance, the winner’s curse can overestimate the VfM. For this reason, we 
consider the important recommendation of Sarmento (2010) to make the effort to conduct a 
PSC prior to the bid.   
We also derived an alternative R indicator to distinguish when a project was more likely to be 
renegotiated. According to the indicator obtained, whether a PPP project should be renegotiated 
positively depends on the social discount rate, public waiting time, extra costs, level of risk 
transferred, percentage of cost and the public financing interest rate and negatively depends on 
the level of private risk, the spread required by the financial system and the equity level. 
In the present work and due to limited information, we applied the second indicator to four 
case studies of PPP projects in which renegotiations were requested. We note that in the UK 
case, which has more solid institutions, the decision to not renegotiate is in accordance with the 
results of the indicator. China also behaves as suggested by the indicator by renegotiating the 
project. The Taiwan case is more complicated due to the financial crisis that affected the region. 
In this case, large interest rates may affect the VfM of retendering the project and may not be 
considered in the computation of the indicator. However, the main mistake was to adopt a very 
important and expensive project as a PPP. Finally, Portugal seems to be a clear case of weak 
governance, and the indicator suggested not renegotiating with a probability of 11.39%. 
However, the government renegotiated the conditions with the developer for reasons explained 
by Ferreira (2014) and Marquez and Cruz (2011). These authors blame this miscalculation on a 
weak government position when renegotiating due to personnel changes in the public 
stakeholders (there were 8 different ministers, 3 secretaries of state and 3 project leaders 
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involved) and poor government preparation of concession contracts. It is clear that asymmetric 
information and know-how differences between the companies and the government are large, 
as suggested by Marques (2017). Note also that Portugal, as mentioned above, has the worst 
rank (position 95) of the four countries in the public-sector performance index compared to the 
rest of the four countries. In fact, considering the efficiency of the legal framework for settling 
disputes, Portugal ranks 121st out of 137 countries. Marques (2017) asserts that contract 
management is not enough and does not replace renegotiation, highlighting the important role 
of an independent regulator. 
The R indicator is more theoretical and its application in this paper is based on poor 
information about the different analyzed projects because the indicator is used to study relations 
between economic and financial variables and the correct decision. However, we consider that 
the alternative indicator based on the PSC could be estimated by the government, since it 
utilizes many of the available tools applied to compute the VfM. Although the indicator can be 
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